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Abstract 
This paper seeks to provide some theoretical and empirical answers to the following question: 
Does the institutional environment affect the causality relationship between banking 
development and economic growth? 
In the theoretical part, we develop an endogenous growth model where the institutional 
environment is captured through two indicators: the judicial system efficiency and the 
easiness of informal trade. We show that an improvement of the institutional environment has 
two effects. First, it intensifies the causality direction from banking to economic growth 
through a reduction of defaulting loans. Second, it reduces the interest rate spread. In the 
empirical part, considering twenty-two MENA countries over the period 1984-2004, we find 
a bi-directional causality. The first one, which runs from banking development to economic 
growth, is more intense in countries with a more developed institutional environment. The 
second causality runs from economic growth to banking and indicates that a more developed 
economy has a more developed banking system. 
 
 
 
 
ﺺﺨﻠﻣ 
ﻰﻟﺇ ﺙﺤﺒﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﻑﺩﻬﻴﻰﺘﻵﺍ لﺍﺅﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻋ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﺭﻅﻨﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﺒﺎﺠﻹﺍ ﺽﻌﺒ ﻡﻴﺩﻘﺘ  : ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﺴﺴﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﺜﺅﺘ لﻫ
؟ﻯﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻓﺭﺼﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﺔﻴﺒﺒﺴﻟﺍ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟﺍ  
ﺎﻤﻫ ﻥﻴﺭﺸﺅﻤ لﻼﺨ ﻥﻤ ﺔﻴﺴﺴﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺩﺼﺭ ﻪﻴﻓ ﻡﺘﻴ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﺨﺍﺩ ﹰﺎﺠﺫﻭﻤﻨ ﺭﻭﻁﻨ ،ﺔﻴﺭﻅﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺤﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ : ﺓﺀﺎﻔﻜ
ﺔﻟﻭﻬﺴﻭ ﻰﺌﺎﻀﻘﻟﺍ ﻡﺎﻅﻨﻟﺍﺔﻴﻤﺴﺭﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﻏ ﺓﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ  . ﺩﻴﺯﻴ ﻪﻨﺃ ﻭﻫ ﺎﻤﻬﻟﻭﺃ ،ﻥﺍﺭﺜﺃ ﻪﻟ ﺔﻴﺴﺴﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﻥﺴﺤﺘ ﻥﺃ ﻥﻴﺒﻨﻭ
ﺓﺩﺩﺴﻤﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﻏ ﺽﻭﺭﻘﻟﺍ ﻡﺠﺤ ﺽﻴﻔﺨﺘ لﻼﺨ ﻥﻤ ﻯﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻰﻓﺭﺼﻤﻟﺍ لﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺔﻴﺒﺒﺴﻟﺍ ﻩﺎﺠﺘﺍ . ﺭﺜﻷﺍﻭ
ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﺃ ﻊﻴﺯﻭﺘ ﻑﻔﺨﻴ ﻪﻨﺃ ﻭﻫ ﻰﻨﺎﺜﻟﺍ . ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﺒ ﺎﻨﻤﻗ ﺩﻘﻓ ،ﻰﻠﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻕﺸﻟﺍ ﻰﻓﻭ22ﻟﻭﺩ  ﻁﺴﻭﻷﺍ ﻕﺭﺸﻟﺍ ﻰﻓ ﺔ
 ﻥﻤ ﺓﺭﺘﻔﻟﺍ ﻯﺩﻤ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎﻴﻘﻴﺭﻓﺃ لﺎﻤﺸﻭ1984-2004ﻩﺎﺠﺘﻻﺍ ﺔﻴﺌﺎﻨﺜ ﺔﻴﺒﺒﺴ ﺔﻗﻼﻋ ﺎﻨﺩﺠﻭ ﺙﻴﺤ ، . ﻰﻟﻭﻷﺍ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟﺍﻭ
 ﺔﺌﻴﺒ ﺩﻭﺠﻭﺒ ﺯﻴﻤﺘﺘ ﻰﺘﻟﺍ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻰﻓ ﺓﺩﺸ ﺭﺜﻜﺃ ﻯﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻰﻓﺭﺼﻤﻟﺍ لﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘ ﻩﺎﺠﺘﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺭﻴﺴﺘ ﻰﺘﻟﺍ
ﹰﺍﺭﻭﻁﺘ ﺭﺜﻜﺃ ﺔﻴﺴﺴﺅﻤ .ﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺒﺒﺴﻟﺍ ﺔﻗﻼﻋ ﺭﻴﺴﺘﻭ ﺭﻴﺸﺘ ﻰﻫﻭ ،ﻰﻓﺭﺼﻤﻟﺍ لﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻯﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﻩﺎﺠﺘﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺔﻴﻨﺎﺜ
ﹰﺍﺭﻭﻁﺘ ﺭﺜﻜﺃ ﻰﻓﺭﺼﻤ ﻡﺎﻅﻨ ﻪﺒ ﺩﺠﻭﻴ ﹰﺍﺭﻭﻁﺘ ﺭﺜﻜﻷﺍ ﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻥﺃ ﻰﻟﺇ. 
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1. Introduction 
The positive interrelationship between financial development and economic growth was first 
empirically established by Goldsmith (1969) and confirmed by King and Levine (1993) who 
found evidence that a well-developed financial system promotes growth by channeling credit 
to its most productive uses. However, the causality direction in this interrelationship seems to 
depend on the studied countries. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) found bidirectional 
causality for half of their sample, and for the other countries it is the economic development 
which causes the financial development. Beck et al. (2000) found a positive effect of 
financial development on growth. Shan et al. (2001) affirmed that the causality direction 
depends on the studied countries. Is there a plausible explanation for these results? 
Some empirical studies (Stulz (2001), Levine (1998) and Beck et al. (2001)) established that 
a country's financial development is related to its institutional characteristics. Particularly, 
they argued that the legal framework is crucial in the establishment of a developed financial 
system. Hence, we expect that the causality direction between the financial development and 
economic growth will depend on the institutional environment. For the banking system the 
legal framework is particularly important. Indeed, in case of a loan default the bank often has 
the right to seize a collateral. However, the implementation of this right in practice depends 
on the cost of the judicial procedure and the rule of law. Besides, in many developing 
countries most banks are public and are constrained to finance the government and to 
rationalize private firms which may undermine economic growth. This paper, delves into the 
potential interaction of the institutional environment (Law and order, regulation) with the 
interrelationship between banking development and economic growth. 
After the emergence of the endogenous growth theory many theoretical models were 
constructed (Bencivenga and Smith (1993), Bose and Cothern (1996), Blackburn and Hung 
(1998) ) to analyze the causality direction in the banking development/economic growth 
relationships. Their common approach consists of the integration of a micro-economic model 
of financial contract theory in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. These studies 
explain how important is financial development for economic growth (through increasing of 
invested capital and improving its quality and allocation). However, they don't include any 
role of the institutional environment in their analysis. While related to the above cited studies, 
the model we develop in the theoretical part of this paper ponders the effective role of the 
institutional environment in the banking development/economic growth relationship. The 
model assigns two roles to a competitive banking sector: diversifying the risks of the 
entrepreneurs' projects and enforcing the debt contract. Indeed, banks receive deposits from 
lenders and offer loans to the entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur is endowed with one-period 
investment project which is subject to random, idiosyncratic productivity shocks (as in 
Townsend (1979)). When the shock is sufficiently bad (under a determined threshold) the 
entrepreneur finds it optimal to default on loan. In this case, the bank seizes a fraction of the 
realized output by turning to the judicial system. The higher the seized fraction, the more 
efficient the judicial procedure is. In case of default, the entrepreneur has no choice but to 
informally sell the unseized part of the output. The more institutionally developed an 
economy is, the higher its cost of informal trade is. Hence, in this model the institutional 
environment is captured through two indicators: the judicial system’s efficiency and how 
easy it is for the defaulting entrepreneurs to sell their production informally. This model 
enables the institutional environment to affect the economy's equilibrium and its development 
path in each period. We show that an improvement of the institutional environment reduces 
the proportion of defaulting entrepreneurs. This enhances the positive effect of banking on 
economic growth. Besides, we show that the interest rate spread is endogenously determined 
and decreases with the quality of the institutional environment. 
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From the empirical perspective, Arestis and Demetriades (1997) is, to our knowledge, the 
only empirical study that analyzes the effect of the institutional environment on the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. The empirical 
methodology they use classifies the twelve studied countries in two groups that have different 
institutional factors (the types of financial systems and financial policies). In the empirical 
part of this paper, we analyze the effects of the institutional environment using a more robust 
approach. A twenty-two Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries panel is used 
to analyze the dynamic relationship between economic growth and banking development, 
(defined as the size of credit to the private sector plus the spread between the lending and 
deposit rates), over the period 1984-2004. Bivariate Granger causality relationships between 
the two variables are investigated. The model controls for inflation, institutional factors such 
as the rule of law and regulation, and the interaction of institutional factors with banking and 
economic growth. Given the cross-sectional heterogeneity present in many panel data sets, 
we use two approaches. The first is the mixed fixed and random (MFR) Model suggested by 
Hsiao (1989) and applied by Nair and Weinhold (NW, 2001) in a dynamic panel context. 
Unlike traditional fixed effects estimators, MFR estimation allows for heterogeneous 
dynamics and thus avoids the serious Pesaran (2003) type biases induced by imposing 
unrealistic homogeneity conditions on coefficients of the lagged dependent variables. The 
second is Granger-causality testing using average Wald statistics. Recent theoretical 
developments in Granger causality methods have made tests using limited time series 
possible through the use of panel data (Larraín et al. (1997), Hurlin and Venet (HV) (2003) 
and Hurlin (2004)). This study employs bivariate Granger causality tests using Hurlins (2004) 
methodology. The empirical analysis shows bidirectional causality. The existence of 
feedback causality between banking development and economic growth (or lack thereof) has 
far-reaching policy implications. Banking development spurs economic growth and will, 
simultaneously, be reinforced by it. 
This paper attempts to answer theoretically and empirically the following question (for 
MENA region): Does the institutional environment affect the causality relationship between 
banking development and economic growth? The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
develops the theoretical model. Section 3 investigates the model empirically. Section 4 
presents relevant policy recommendations. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. The Theoretical Model 
The model integrates some features of Townsend (1979) in an endogenous growth model 
with overlapping generations. It enables the institutional environment to play a role in the 
banking-growth nexus. This is channeled through the lending interest rate which will be 
endogenously determined. The structure of the model is detailed in the following sub-section. 
2.1. The Economic Environment 
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0,1,...,∞. There is an infinite number of two-period-lived 
agents belonging to overlapping generations of non-altruistic families. Each generation is 
composed of a mass 1 identical lenders and a mass 1 of identical entrepreneurs. All agents 
consume in the second period of life and are all risk neutral. An initial generation of old 
agents coexists with young agents at date t =0. There are two goods (two sectors) in the 
economy: a final (or consumption) good and a capital good. 
Each young lender is endowed with one unit of labor which he supplies during its first-
period-live inelastically at no disutility cost to the final good sector. In compensation for his 
work, he earns a wage which he entirely saves in the bank for old-period consumption. The 
bank receives deposits from lenders and loan to entrepreneurs of the same generation. 
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Each entrepreneur invests in one investment good project in the first period of life and 
operates it in the second period of life. The project uses the final good as an input to produce 
the capital good and is subject to random, idiosyncratic productivity shocks which are 
revealed to the bank ex post only at a cost. In case of the entrepreneur's default on loans, the 
bank seizes a fraction of the realized output which reflects the efficiency of the judicial 
system. In all cases the investment good is sold to the final good sector. However, we assume 
that defaulting leaves no choice to the entrepreneur but informally selling the unseized part of 
its output to the final good sector. Thus, he incurs an additional cost relative to the non-
defaulting entrepreneur. This cost will be higher in a more institutionally developed economy 
where the incentive to be a defaulting entrepreneur is weaker. 
2.2. The Final Good Sector 
The final good is obtained instantaneously from the combination of two substitutable factors: 
capital (good) K and labor L. The technology which is assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas type 
exhibits constant factors' return but includes an aggregate level of "knowledge" A (à la 
Romer (1986)) which enables the endogenous growth of the aggregate production: 
 
We associate At to the aggregate stock of capital:  
 
This specification is common in the literature (Bose and Cothern (1996)) and allows for a 
constant price of the final good which simplifies the financial structure of the model. Hence, 
the final good production is equal to the capital stock  
 
and the per capita output is given by 
 
The output is entirely distributed to the workers and to the entrepreneurs producing the 
capital good. Finally, capital depreciates fully after production and the factor's prices are 
equal to their marginal productivities:  α for capital and (1-α) kt for labor. Hence, wages are 
given by 
 
 (1)
This signifies that wages increase with capital accumulation.   
 
2.3. The Entrepreneurs 
Each generation contains a continuum of mass 1 entrepreneurs indexed by h. An entrepreneur 
of generation t  (born at t -1) invests in a capital good project during his first period of life 
and acquires entrepreneurial skills. He then operates the project in the second period of life. 
Having no initial wealth he seeks external financing. Thus, he signs a debt contract    
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with a bank providing him an amount  of the consumption good at date t. At date t + 1 he 
should repay    where   designs the lending interest rate during period t + 1. The 
production function relating the capital good output     of the entrepreneur h to the 
consumption good input    is given by 
 (2)
where  is an idiosyncratic shock assumed to be distributed symmetrically with a density 
 over  where  to ensure the output is always positive. 
The producer h may have an incentive to default on the debt. In this case, the bank is able to 
seize a fraction λ<1 of the realized value of output. The fraction λ reflects the efficiency of 
the judicial system. Whether the entrepreneur defaults or not the output is sold to the final 
good sector. The non defaulting entrepreneur sells it at the price α in terms of the final good 
and honors its debt. However, in case of default the bank seizes the amount   of the 
output and then sell it for the final good sector at the price α. For the defaulting entrepreneur 
we assume that the unseized output is sold informally to the final good sector, otherwise it 
will also be seized. Besides, only a fraction              γ ≤1 will be sold. One expects that the 
more institutionally developed the economy the lower the informal activity will be. Then, the 
entrepreneur wealth at date t+1 is   in case of default and  
  otherwise. At this stage we can derive the expression 
of the productivity shock threshold  below which default occurs. Indeed, default occurs 
when, ex-post  which gives us 
 (3)
 
2.4. The Lenders and the Banking System 
A lender of generation t (born at t-1) receives a wage    after having supplied his unit of 
labor to the consumption good sector. This wage is entirely deposited in the bank for old-
period consumption. We denote the deposit interest rate by  and assume it is exogenous. 
The bank receives deposits from lenders of generation t and loan to entrepreneurs of the same 
generation. Since entrepreneurs and lenders are of same size, and given that all entrepreneurs 
are identical ex ante, the amount of the loan per entrepreneur is equal to the lender deposit:    
 (4)
The banking system is assumed to be competitive which forces the bank to earn zero profit. 
Besides, the representative bank is assumed to deal with a large number of entrepreneurs 
which enables it to diversify the idiosyncratic risk . At date t+1, the representative bank's 
net profit realized on the non defaulting entrepreneurs   is given by the difference 
between contractual repayment and the gross cost of funds: 
 
(5)
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The representative bank's net profit realized on the defaulting entrepreneurs   is equal to 
the seized fraction of the output minus the cost of deposits: 
 
(6)
Assuming a competitive banking system the lending interest rate is set such that the total 
bank's net profit is zero: . Using equations (2), (5) and (6) we obtain 
 
  (7)
that is  
 (8)
where      and   represents the mean of the 
productivity shock faced by the defaulting projects 
2.5 The Dynamics of Capital Accumulation 
Capital dynamics depend on the quantity of capital good available at each period for the final 
good production sector. This quantity is produced by defaulting and non-defaulting capital 
good projects. Contrarily to the later, only a fraction of the former production is sold. At date 
t+1, the available quantity of the capital good is the sum of three terms: the quantity seized 
and sold by the bank, the fraction γ of the unseized output sold by defaulting entrepreneurs 
and the quantity produced and sold by the successful entrepreneurs: 
 
which yields the following gross growth expression using (1), (2) and (4) 
 
(9)
2.6 The Institutional Environment and the Banking-Growth Nexus 
Proposition 1 
An improvement of the institutional environment (more efficient judicial system and/or 
costliest informal trade) reduces the proportion of unsuccessful projects financed by banks. 
Proof  
In the Appendix we show that   and  . Therefore the proportion of 
successful project  decreases when the judicial system is more 
efficient (λ increases) or when the cost of informal trade increases. That is, entrepreneurs 
have less incentive to default. 
Corollary 1 
An improvement of the institutional environment enhances the positive effect of banking on 
economic growth.  
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Proof  
See Appendix. An intuitive explanation that improves the institutional environment reduces 
the proportion of unsuccessful projects financed by banks. Therefore, capital accumulation 
accelerates to bolster economic growth. 
Corollary 2 
An improvement of the institutional environment reduces the interest rate spread. 
Proof. See Appendix. More succinctly, this result can be interpreted in the context of the 
banking-growth nexus. In specific, the interest rate spread is frequently used as an indicator 
of banking development (more precisely of credit rationing). Hence, one possible channel 
through which economic growth may enhance banking development is the improvement of 
the institutional environment. For this result to apply in this model we need an additional 
assumption: the cost of informal selling of the capital good increases as the economy 
develops (capital accumulates): . This is not an unrealistic assumption since 
many empirical studies confirm that the share of the informal sector in the total economic 
activity decreases with the level of economic development (Pratap and Quintin (2006)). 
However, this is obviously not the case for the efficiency of the judicial system. 
3. The Empirical Model 
3.1 Data and Methodology 
In this paper a panel of twenty-two Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries 
over the period 1984-2004 is used to analyze the dynamic relationship between economic 
growth and banking development (emergence). Bivariate Granger causality relationships 
between the two variables are investigated. The model controls for inflation, institutional 
factors such as the rule of law and regulation, and the interaction of institutional factors with 
banking and economic growth. The list of countries and definitions of the data and their 
sources are included in Tables 1 and 2.  
Only GDP per capita is expressed in natural logarithmic form, the others may take on 
negative values. Modeling banking development (economic growth) as a function of 
economic growth (banking development growth) and the control variables, as opposed to 
levels, ensures that the results from a panel of countries applies as much as possible to 
individual countries. Growth rates are more predictive of variables' changes than their levels. 
Another advantage of using growth rates of the independent variables is that the variables are 
much more likely to be stationary, which is a prerequisite for causality testing1. 
Given the cross-sectional heterogeneity present in many panel data sets, even with a correctly 
specified model, it is reasonable to expect that one variable may help predict another for most 
but not all of the cross-sectional units. In a heterogeneous data set it is possible that the mean 
coefficient could take statistically significant (or insignificant) values of either sign without 
reflecting much underlying economic meaning. We should, therefore, be wary of judging the 
degree of causality by how significant the test statistic is. To mitigate the problems associated 
with heterogeneity, this paper uses the following two approaches: 
a) The first is the mixed fixed and random (MFR) Model suggested by Hsiao (1989) and 
applied by Nair and Weinhold (NW, 2001) in a dynamic panel context. Unlike 
traditional panel fixed effects estimators, MFR estimation allows for heterogeneous 
dynamics and thus avoids the serious Pesaran (2003) type biases induced by imposing 
                                                          
1 Unit root tests using the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2002) test has been performed. 
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unrealistic homogeneity conditions on coefficients of the lagged dependent variables 
2. 
b) The second approach is Granger-causality testing using average Wald statistics. 
Recent theoretical developments in Granger causality methods have made tests using 
limited time series possible through the use of panel data (Larraín et al. (1997); Hurlin 
and Venet (HV) (2004); and Hurlin (2004))3. This study employs bivariate Granger 
causality tests on economic growth and banking development using Hurlin's (2004) 
methodology. 
In this paper the main emphasis is on exploring causal relationships rather than 
contemporaneous correlations4. The basic MFR model is: 
Similar equations are set for the growth of banking development as a dependent variable of 
development. Besides the dynamic effect of growth, the lagged dependent variable provides 
an excellent proxy for many omitted variables. As NW demonstrate, the MFR procedure 
requires only the assumption of homogeneity in the distribution of the estimates on the lagged 
dependent variable, rather than homogeneity of the parameters themselves. Thus MFR 
causality models allow for complete heterogeneity of the coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable and hence avoid the potentially serious bias imposed by the assumption of 
homogeneity in the coefficients on these terms. As an added feature, in the course of its 
estimation MFR also provides important panel diagnostics. In particular, the variance of the 
coefficients on the xi provides an indicator of heterogeneity in the panel. Where these 
variances are large compared to their respective coefficients, the researcher must treat the 
causality estimates from any estimation procedure as highly suspect5. 
Weinhold (1996) uses simulations to demonstrate how such a specification outperforms 
traditional panel data causality procedures (such as Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988)) in the presence 
of heterogeneity. MFR estimated coefficients, standard errors, and variance of the indicated 
causal variables are reported in Tables 5. Hurlin (2004) adapts a simple Granger (1969) 
causality test for heterogeneous panel data models with fixed coefficients. Granger (1969) 
posits that for each individual (country) the variable x is causing y if we are better able to 
predict y using all available information than if we exclude x. Hurlin (2004), thus, contends 
that if x and y are observed on N individuals, we should be able to determine the optimal 
information set used to forecast y. The basic idea is to assume that there exists a minimal 
statistical representation common to x and y for at least a subgroup of individuals. Granger 
(1969) causality applies to homogenous time series when N causality relationships exist and 
when the individual predictors of y obtained conditionally on past values of y and x are 
identical. Heterogeneity exists when the individual predictors of y are not the same across 
                                                          
2 Pesaran (1992, 1995) argues that the imposition of homogeneity assumptions on the coefficients of lagged 
dependent variables, when in fact the dynamics are heterogeneous across the panel, can lead to serious biases 
that cannot be corrected with instrumental variables estimation. 
3 Coondoo and Dinda (2002) used panel data Granger causality to test for causality between pollution and per 
capita GDP. 
4 To save on space the results from contemporaneous correlations or the Holtz-Eakin type of dynamic panel 
(based on one lag and no differencing) will not be reported. However, the model is the first difference of the 
one-lag model. Using two lags did not change the results. 
5 Following NW, the RHS variables are orthogonalized. As explained by NW, MFR is achieved through a 
transformation formula developed by Hsiao (1989). To do this transformation, we used a modified version of 
the code available on Weinhold's (1996) web site. 
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countries. Hurlin (2004) and Hurlin and Venet (2001) incorporated Granger causality testing 
between variables x and y, taking into account potential cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
panel by distinguishing between the heterogeneity in the causal relationship between x and y, 
and the heterogeneity of the data generating process (DGP). This is done by distinguishing 
between a heterogeneous non-causality (HENC) hypothesis and a homogenous non-causality 
(HNC) hypothesis adopted by Holtz-Eakin and al. (1988). Under HENC, causality between 
two variables (not necessarily with the same DGP) may be present in one subgroup of 
countries and absent in another. 
Following Hurlin (2004), a Granger non-causality test statistic is generated by averaging 
standard individual Wald statistics. Hurlin and Venet (2001) and Hurlin (2004) characterize 
the distribution of this estimator and provide approximations for its first moments. From this 
characterization, an approximated standardized average Wald statistic is proposed to test the 
heterogeneous non-causality hypothesis (HNC) for small T and N sample. Hurlin's (2004) 
model is: 
where  are iid with   and  finite heterogeneous variances. x and 
y, observed on T periods and N individuals, are covariance stationary variables. αi are 
assumed to be fixed. Lag orders K are identical for all cross-section units of the panel and the 
panel is balanced. Autoregressive parameters of the lagged dependent variables and  
regression coefficients of the explanatory variables are different across groups. Importantly, 
unlike Weinhold (1999) and Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001), parameters  and are 
both constant, not random. That is, the model has fixed coefficients with fixed individual 
effects. Unlike Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Hurlin's (2004) causality is more general where 
non-causality may exist for  individual processes with no causality from x to y, while 
causality may exist for   
If N1 = 0 , x Granger causes y for all individuals, irrespective of the homogeneity (or lack 
thereof) of the data generating process. Likewise, if N1 >0 then the causality relationship is 
heterogeneous. To allow for the possibility of non-causality in a subgroup N1 and possible 
causality in other subgroups , Hurlin (2004) proposed using the 
average of individual Wald statistics to test the homogeneous non-causality hypothesis 
(HNC) for subgroups (low-income, middle-income, oil, non-oil countries), i=1,...,N, such that 
6: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6   Wi are generated as summation of the F-statistic, (K/N)∑Fi, where:  
where RSSr = restricted sum of squared residual and RSSu= unrestricted sum of squared residuals computed 
from equation (1);K= number of lags or number of parameters ;dfu and dfr are the degrees of freedom of 
unrestricted and restricted regressions, respectively; dfu - dfr =T-2K-1; and T= number of years. 
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3.2 Empirical Results 
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics. The standard deviation and range between the 
minimum and maximum show that in MENA the lending rates and deposit rates spreads are 
very high. That is , the high lending rates are used as a tool of rationing credit and slowing 
down the banking development process. It is also clear that inflation and the interaction of 
economic growth with the rule of law are highly volatile. Similarly, the interaction of GDP 
growth with government regulation shows high volatility. 
We test for causality rather than perform correlation-based regressions, using MFR (Table 5) 
as well as Hurlin's (2004) approach. A summary of the causality results is included in Table 
6. The two approaches yield similar causality results. This enhances the reliability of the 
results and their policy implications. Each of the two approaches provides a different set of 
useful information about the data. Specifically, Wald statistics show causality results that are 
based on dynamic fixed effects heterogeneous panel data. MFR results are dynamic, mixed, 
fixed, and random effects panel data analyses, displaying signs and variances of the 
coefficients. To mitigate heterogeneity, the sample countries have been subdivided into low 
and middle income countries, and for comparative purposes, the results for the entire sample 
have been produced. 
Using the Hurlin (2004) approach, Table 4 shows that in all countries there is bidirectional 
causality between banking and economic growth. This emphasizes that banking and growth 
are simultaneously determined. The results are consistent with our theoretical findings which 
found similar feedback causality. However, the MFR methodology revealed more 
information – that the two-way causality of economic growth exists only with the interaction 
variable of banking and the rule of law, indicating that without application of the rule of law, 
banking development may not cause economic growth. 
In all countries the interaction of the banking system with the rule of law is significant. That 
is for banking to be effective in economic development, the rule of law has to apply. Laeven 
and Giovanni (2003) have found that judicial efficiency and low inflation decrease the cost of 
credit from banks. In fact, the rule of law causes a significant and positive impact on 
economic growth. As expected, inflation negatively impacts growth and banking 
development. Regulation is also significant and negatively impacts economic growth. 
Notice that banking development is defined as the size of credit to the private sector (credit to 
the private sector as a ratio of GDP) plus credit rationing (the spread between the lending and 
deposit rates). Thus, causality running from economic growth to banking indicates banking 
development and loosening of credit rationing. Mitigation of credit rationing is also 
indicative of lower (negative change) regulations (market imperfections) as the results clearly 
show. Also, the feedback causality going from banking development to economic growth 
shows that banks are financing productive projects, despite the existence of credit rationing. 
4. Policy Recommendations 
Several economic studies and country experiences support the financial liberalization policy 
arguing that it leads to increased domestic saving and investment. Our analysis suggests that, 
in order to be growth-enhancing, this policy should be coupled with an improvement of the 
institutional environment. It is particularly urgent to modernize the judicial system (and let’s 
say the entire administrative procedure that takes part of the litigation process), improve the 
legal framework and reduce corruption and informal activities which are partly responsible of 
the high levels of non- performing loans. Indeed, the theoretical and empirical models show 
that the banking development enhances economic growth conditioning on the quality of the 
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institutional environment. Reciprocally, economic growth will lead to a more developed 
banking system when the quality of the institutional environment is not mediocre.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper seeks to provide some theoretical and empirical answers to the following question: 
Does the institutional environment affect the causality relationship between banking 
development and economic growth? In the theoretical part of this paper an endogenous 
growth model is developed where the institutional environment is captured through two 
indicators : the judicial system efficiency and the easiness to trade informally. We show that 
an improvement of the institutional environment reduces the proportion of defaulting 
entrepreneurs. This enhances the positive effect of banking on economic growth. Besides, we 
show that the interest rate spread is endogenously determined and decreases with the quality 
of the institutional environment. The empirical analysis shows a bidirectional causality 
banking development and economic growth. Causality runs from banking development to 
economic growth. Thus, a more developed banking system finances more successful 
productive projects. An important result that elucidates the theoretical findings is that 
causality direction is more intense in countries with more developed institutional 
environment (measured by the rule of law and regulation). The feedback causality, running 
from economic growth to banking, indicates that a more developed economy has a more 
developed banking system. This implies that the credit to the private sector increases and the 
interest spread diminishes as the economy develops for a given institutional environment. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Let's omit the time index t from notation. Using equation (3) we have  
where β=(1-γ(1-λ)) and replacing it in (8) we find that the productivity shock threshold ε∗ is 
solution of the equation g(ε) = h(ε) on [-εm, εm]  where 
Let's analyze some properties of the functions g and h. First, noting that p(-εm) = 1 and p(εm) 
= 0 we have g(-εm)=β(1-εm)>0 and g(εm)=0. Second, noting that s(-εm) = s(-εm)=0 we have  
h(-εm)=1+rd and h(εm)=1-λ+rd > 0. Besides, noting that p′(ε) = ∂p/∂ε = -f(ε) < 0 and ∂s/∂ε = - 
εp′(ε)>0 we obtain   
 
Let's remember the classic property of the symmetric distribution function f: there is ε in [-
εm,εm] such that f′ ≥ 0 over [-εm, ε] and f′ ≤ 0 over [ε, εm]. Therefore, there exists ε in  [-εm,εm]  
such that g ′′≤0 over [-εm, ε] and g ′′≥0  over [ε, εm]. Similarly, there exist ε in [-εm,εm]  such 
that h′′ ≤ 0 over [-εm, ε] and h′′ ≥ 0 over [ε, εm]. Hence, it is easy to show that the equation 
g(ε) = h(ε) have at most two solutions: . The following figure represents a possible 
configuration of two solutions and how they move if β increases. 
 
In this case, it is the solution  which takes place in practice. Indeed, remember that for a 
given institutional environment (β is given) the default threshold is linked to the lending 
interest rate through the following relation . Since we assume that the 
banking system is perfectly competitive, therefore banks will charge the lowest interest rate 
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that insure a zero profit which corresponds to a minimum unsuccessful projects or 
equivalently to  . Note that in the region ]-εm ,εm[ the profit is strictly positive. The 
previous figure shows that an increase of β decreases . Hence, an increase of the judicial 
system efficiency (an increase of λ) or a more costly informal trade (a decrease of γ) will 
decrease  and increase the proportion of successful projects. Let's analyze analytically how 
 a solution of g(ε) = h(ε) will vary if γ or λ varies. Simple algebra calculus based on 
differentiation of (8) relatively to γ respectively to λ gives us the following equations : 
where 
 (10)
Hence, if ∆(ε∗) > 0 we obtain  ∂ε∗/∂γ >0 and  ∂ε∗/∂λ <0. From the previous figure this is the 
case of the economically acceptable solution  which verifies  or 
equivalently . 
Proof of Corollary 1 
From proposition 1 we showed that ∂ε∗/∂γ >0 and ∂ε∗/∂λ < 0. This implies ∂p(ε∗)/∂γ < 0, 
∂p(ε∗)/∂λ > 0, ∂s(ε∗)/∂γ > 0 and ∂s(ε∗)/∂λ < 0 where  and 
. From equation (9) it is obvious that  
 
To show that ∂(kt+1/kt) /  ∂λ > 0 some algebra should be done. From (9) we have 
From proof of proposition 1 we have 
Replacing it in the previous equation shows that ∂(kt+1/kt) / ∂λ > 0 has the same sign as the 
following term which can 
be easily shown to be positive using equation (10) and β = (1 – γ (1 – λ ) ). 
Proof of Corollary 2 
From equation (3) we have  
 
Therefore 
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From proof of proposition 1 we have 
Replacing it in the previous equation shows that  has the same sign as the following 
term 
which can be easily shown to be negative using equation (10) and β=(1 – γ ( 1 – λ )). The 
proof of is based on a similar reasoning. 
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Table 1: Country List 
Countries 
Algeria 
Bahrain 
Cyprus 
Egypt 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Malta 
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
UAE 
Yemen 
 
Table 2: Variable definitions 
Var  Definition  Source 
law Law and order International County Risk Guide (ICRG) 
infl Inflation World Bank Development Indicators (WB) 
banking Private credit/GDP +spread International Financial Statistics (IFS), WB 
regulation Credit to government/total credit IFS and WB 
spread Lending rate-deposit rate IFS 
gdppc Natural log of per-capita GDP WB 
banklaw banking*law  
bankreg banking*regulation  
gdplaw gdppc*law  
gdpreg gdppc*reg  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Low Income 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
law 220 3.257 1.342 0 6 
banking 129 0.092 0.246 -0.029 2.533 
regulation 219 0.418 1.030 -1.037 15.079 
gdppc 223 7.962 0.753 6.215 9.041 
spread 136 5.118 3.570 -2.950 23.12 
infl 219 19.466 26.193 -9.809 132.824 
      
Middle Income 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
law 251 3.823 1.413 1 6 
banking 150 0.170 0.496 0.004 3.847 
regulation 229 0.099 2.612 -20.890 29.712 
gdppc 181 9.483 0.550 6.445 10.415 
spread 179 8.79 37.4 0.41 385 
infl 194 11.535 50.250 -9.892 487.578 
 
Table 4: Hurlin Summary 
Income Dep var Caus var Wald DFr DFur Nr Nur Groups 
Overall g(banking) g(gdppc) 60.551 98 80 194 188 12 
Overall g(gdppc) g(banking) 3.352 102 80 198 188 12 
Low g(banking) g(gdppc) 1.838 45 36 93 90 6 
Low g(gdppc) g(banking) 4.185 48 35 96 89 6 
Middle g(banking) g(gdppc) 119.339 53 43 101 97 6 
Middle g(gdppc) g(banking) 4.185 48 35 96 89 6 
 
Table 5: MFR Summary 
Dep var: g(banking) Income Group 
Variable Overall Low Middle 
L.g(law) .069*** 0.110*** -0.004 
L.g(infl) .0129*** 0.014 0.012*** 
L.g(regulation) -0.004 -0.008 0.006 
L.g(gdppc) 0.001 0.010 0.004* 
L.g(gdpreg) -0.007 -0.017 0.004 
L.g(gdplaw) -0.018*** -0.017* -0.016** 
Cons 0.082* 0.247*** 0.048* 
    
N 204 106 98 
Number of groups 12 6 6 
    
Dep var: g(gdpc) Income Group 
Variable Overall Low Middle 
L.g(law) 0.356*** 0.315*** 0.346*** 
L.g(infl) -0.041*** -0.079** -0.008 
L.g(banking) 0.052*** -0.016 0.016 
L.g(regulation) -0.080*** -0.058 -0.061*** 
L.g(bankreg) -0.010 -0.034 0.018 
L.g(banklaw) -0.190*** -0.152*** -0.193*** 
Cons 8.610*** 8.423*** 8.803*** 
    
N 214 115 99 
Number of groups 12 6 6 
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Table 6: Causality Summary 
Income Dep Var Caus Var Wald MFR 
Overall g(banking) g(gdppc) 60.551 0.001 
Overall g(gdppc) g(banking) 3.352 0.052*** 
Low g(banking) g(gdppc) 1.838 0.010 
Low g(gdppc) g(banking) 4.185 -0.016 
Middle g(banking) g(gdppc) 119.339 0.004* 
Middle g(gdppc) g(banking) 4.185 0.016 
 
 
 
